Managing economic and social profit of cooperative models in three-echelon reverse supply chain for waste electrical and electronic equipment

Highlights

The four model of a three-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) for WEEE are studied.

Optimal coordination strategies in four models are compared.

The model C make the RSC of WEEE achieve maximum economic and social benefit.

Duopolistic retailers make the RSC achieve maximum economic and social benefit.

Abstract

In addition to maximizing economic benefits, reverse supply chains should further seek to maximize social benefits by increasing the quantity of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). The paper investigates cooperative models with different parties in a three-echelon reverse supply chain for WEEE consisting of a single collector, a single remanufacturer, and two retailers based on complete information. In addition, the optimal decisions of four cooperative models and the effect of the market demand of remanufactured WEEE products and the market share of two retailers on the optimal decisions are discussed. The results indicate that optimal total channel profit and recycle quantity in a reverse supply chain are maximized in a centralized model. The optimal total channel profit and recycle quantity increase with an increase in the market demand of remanufactured WEEE products. The three-echelon reverse supply chain consisting of duopolistic retailers maximizes total channel profit and recycle quantity in a reverse supply chain for WEEE.

Graphical abstract

Keywords

Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) / Reverse supply chains / Recycle quantity / Social benefit / Cooperative models / Duopolistic retailers

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No: 71471105).

RIGHTS & PERMISSIONS

2017 Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany