Focal mechanics and disaster characteristics of the 2024 M 7.6 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, Japan

Abstract

On January 1, 2024, a devastating M 7.6 earthquake struck the Noto Peninsula, Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan, resulting in significant casualties and property damage. Utilizing information from the first six days after the earthquake, this article analyzes the seismic source characteristics, disaster situation, and emergency response of this earthquake. The results show: 1) The earthquake rupture was of the thrust type, with aftershock distribution showing a north-east-oriented belt-like feature of 150 km. 2) Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR), observations detected significant westward to north-westward co-seismic displacement near the epicenter, with the maximum horizontal displacement reaching 1.2 m and the vertical uplift displacement reaching 4 m. A two-segment fault inversion model fits the observational data well. 3) Near the epicenter, large Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) and Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) were observed, with the maxima reaching 145 cm/s and 2681 gal, respectively, and the intensity reached the highest level 7 on the Japanese (Japan Meteorological Agency, JMA) intensity standard, which is higher than level 10 of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) standard. 4) The observation of the very rare multiple strong pulse-like ground motion (PLGM) waveform poses a topic worthy of research in the field of earthquake engineering. 5) As of January 7, the earthquake had left 128 deaths and 560 injuries in Ishikawa Prefecture, with 1305 buildings completely or partially destroyed, and had triggered a chain of disasters including tsunamis, fires, slope failures, and road damage. Finally, this paper summarizes the emergency rescue, information dissemination, and other disaster response and management measures taken in response to this earthquake. This work provides a reference case for carrying out effective responses, and offers lessons for handling similar events in the future.

Graphical abstract

Keywords

Noto Peninsula Earthquake / earthquake rupture mechanism / earthquake disaster / emergency response / pulse-like ground motion

1 Introduction

On January 1, 2024, a strong earthquake with a magnitude of 7.6 struck the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan, known as the “The 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake”. According to the data released by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) at 8:00 AM local time on January 3 [1], this earthquake caused significant casualties and property damage, posing major challenges to Japan’s disaster management and emergency response systems. The Noto Peninsula is a prominent part of the north−west of Japan’s Honshu Island, which has historically experienced several strong earthquakes [2]. However, none were as large or destructive as this one. Research on the seismic source physical characteristics of this earthquake is significant for understanding the mechanism of strong earthquake generation in the Pacific plate boundary region, studying seismic structures, deformation patterns, strong earthquake recurrence, and the influence on surrounding faults [3,4].

Earthquake disasters that induced secondary disasters such as landslides, debris flows, tsunamis, and soil liquefaction are key research subjects in earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation engineering [5,6]. Due to the strong destructiveness of these secondary events, they can cause more severe loss of life and property than the earthquake itself. Japan has suffered from several such losses in recent years. For example, the 2018 M_w 6.6 Hokkaido earthquake triggered more than 6000 landslides, occurred over the area of 700 km², causing 44 deaths and more than 660 injuries. Over 80% of the total deaths, caused by the earthquake, were caused by co-seismic landslides [7–9]. The 2016 Kumamoto earthquake triggered landslides, rockfalls, extensive liquefaction, and ground fissures, causing severe damage to densely populated areas in Kumamoto Prefecture such as Mashiki, Nishihara, and Aso [10–12]. Notably, in both of these events, pulse-like ground motions (PLGM) with strong earthquake energy were observed, and these were shown to be one of the main triggers of large-scale landslides [13,14], making the study of disasters induced by strong-energy earthquake motions a particular focus of attention. Recently, earthquake-induced geological disasters in China have also received attention, such as the M_s 6.1 Lushan earthquake on June 1, 2022, the M_s 6.8 Luding earthquake on September 5, 2022, and the M_s 6.2 Gansu Jishishan earthquake on December 18, 2023 [15–17]. These earthquakes induced a large number of landslides, debris flows, and other geological disasters, causing heavy casualties and property losses. Particularly, the 2023 Gansu Jishishan earthquake triggered loess liquefaction landslides and debris flows, burying a village 2 km away and causing numerous casualties.

Rapid and accurate assessment of the distribution of earthquake-induced secondary disasters, and timely provision of information on building damage and casualties, are crucial for guiding post-earthquake emergency response, disaster relief, and reconstruction efforts.

To deepen the understanding of the rupture characteristics of the 7.6 magnitude 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake, to enhance awareness of earthquake disasters, and to explore disaster response and management measures, this study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the earthquake’s rupture characteristics, co-seismic deformation, ground acceleration, and seismic intensity. In particular, the identification of multiple high-energy PLGMs was carried out, revealing the possible causes of secondary disasters in this earthquake event. This paper also outlines the impact of earthquake-induced secondary disasters and the response measures and effectiveness of the Japanese government and relevant agencies. This research can provide a reference for the formulation of future earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation strategies.

2 Seismic source characteristics

The M_j 7.6 earthquake on the Noto Peninsula of Japan occurred at 16:10 local time on January 1, 2024. The epicenter was located 42 km north−east of Anamizu Town in Hōsu District, Ishikawa Prefecture, with a focal depth of 16 km. This earthquake was a typical reverse faulting activity (according to the automatic processing results of the Full Range Seismograph Network of Japan (F-NET) of the National Institute of Earth Sciences and Disaster Prevention). Since 2007, there have been four earthquakes of magnitude 5 or higher around this earthquake location, with the previous largest being a M 6.9 earthquake on March 25, 2007, located about 60 km south−west of the 2024 epicenter. The other three occurred within about 10 km north−east of the 2024 epicenter, specifically on September 16, 2021 (M 5.1), June 19, 2022 (M 5.4), and May 5, 2023 (M 6.5).

2.1 Co-seismic displacement and fault rupture model

Based on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) observations, the JMA provided co-seismic displacement results for the study area, showing that the co-seismic displacement direction in the Noto Peninsula region is primarily westward and north−westward. At a slightly further distance from the epicenter, the displacement is mainly north−westward. The co-seismic displacement near the epicenter reached one meter level, with a horizontal displacement of 1.2 m and a vertical uplift deformation of 1.1 m observed at the Wajima measurement point. Additionally, according to the synthetic aperture radar images from the “ALOS-2” satellite, a maximum of 1 m horizontal displacement and 4 m vertical uplift displacement were observed in the western part of Wajima City [1].

Based on the analysis of Co-seismic displacement results and fault rupture model provided by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) [18]. The aftershocks were distributed along a north−east-trending fault zone about 150 km long. The fault on the north side of the aftershock zone dipped southward, and the fault on the south−east side dipped north-westward. Based on the fault and aftershock distribution, a two-segment fault model constructed according to the GNSS co-seismic displacement results shows that the model’s horizontal displacement results are highly consistent with the GNSS observations, reflecting that the model can well represent the observational data. Specifically, the western segment fault had a top depth of 1.7 km, a length of 60.7 km, a width of 13.0 km, a strike of 50.1°, an inverted dip angle of 25.4°, a slip angle of 128.6°, a slip amount of 3.48 m, and a moment magnitude of M_w 7.21. The eastern segment fault had a top depth of 1.7 km, a length of 76.4 km, a width of 21.9 km, a strike of 66.1°, an inverted dip angle of 54.1°, a slip angle of 105.3°, a slip amount of 2.22 m, and a moment magnitude of M_w 7.30 [18].

2.2 Seismological observation results

We collected five typical observational data and presented the east–west, north–south, and vertical (EW, NS, UD) direction velocity and acceleration records, as shown in Fig.1. The results show that the maximum horizontal acceleration amplitudes (PGA) of three stations exceeded 1400 gal; specifically, ISK006 Fukui Station recorded 2681 gal, ISK003 Wajima Station recorded 1461 gal, and ISK001 Oya Station recorded 1426 gal. Additionally, two stations recorded maximum horizontal velocity amplitudes (PGV) over 110 cm/s; specifically, ISK005 Anamizu Station recorded 145 cm/s and ISK002 Shoin Station recorded 116 cm/s.

In addition to PGV and PGA, the seismic wave energy can also be measured by the cumulative squared velocity (CSV) index [13], defined as:

(1)CSV(t)={\int }_0^t{V}^2(u)\mathrm{d}u,

where CSV(t) denotes the CSV at time t and V(u) is the ground motion velocity at time u.

As shown by the CSV statistics of the five stations provided in Fig.1, the CSVs of Anamizu ISK005 and Shoin ISK002 on the south-east side of the fault exceeded 40000 cm²/s, significantly higher than those on the north-west side at Oya ISK001 and Wajima ISK003 stations, reflecting the larger earthquake wave energy in that area. Additionally, although Fukui ISK006 recorded a huge PGA of 2681 gal, its CSV was only 8086 cm²/s, indicating a comparatively smaller total energy.

2.3 Multiple pulse-like ground motion waveforms

In earthquake engineering, PGA is not the only indicator of seismic destructiveness, but also PLGM generated near faults are of great concern, as PLGM waveforms have tremendous kinetic energy, and are especially destructive to buildings and slopes. The earthquake wave records of several stations near the fault showed a very peculiar phenomenon. Anamizu ISK005 and Shoin ISK002 on the south-east side of the fault recorded CSVs over 40000 cm²/s, significantly higher than at the two stations on the north-west side, Oya ISK001 and Wajima ISK003. Moreover, since the fault is a reverse fault, Anamizu ISK005 and Shoin ISK002 were in the Forward Directivity Effect area of the seismic waves, which should be expected to produce PLGM waveforms [19]. However, using three common methods for PLGM identification [20–22], PLGM waveforms were not identified in the records of Anamizu ISK005 and Shoin ISK002.

On the other hand, even by visual inspection, it is evident that their velocity waveforms contained very large pulse shapes. It’s believed that the waveforms recorded at Anamizu ISK005 and Shoin ISK002 contained multiple strong pulses. Each pulse had significant energy, so the total energy of the seismic waves was large. Existing methods are mainly used for analysis of single strong pulse earthquake waves, using the ratio of the pulse energy to the total waveform energy as a criterion, hence the judgment for multiple pulse PLGM waveforms fails. To verify this hypothesis, we extracted three strong pulses from the EW component of Shoin ISK002 using Baker’s 2007 method [22], and indeed all passed the PLGM test. The extraction method involved covering parts of the waveform other than each strong pulse with records after 200 s. The first extracted PLGM is shown in Fig.2(a). The PGA values of its original ground motion, extracted pulse, and residual ground motion are 730.22, 230.95, 565.28 cm/s², respectively, and the PGVs of the three are 121.40, 78.52, 43.84 cm/s, respectively. The CSV values are 9356, 7279, 2077 cm²/s, respectively. Fig.2(b) is the second PLGM extracted, the PGA values of the three are 661.17, 315.01, 502.69 cm/s², and the PGV values of the three are 109.24, 87.58, 60.74 cm/s, respectively. The CSV values of the three are 11933, 7783, 4150 cm²/s, respectively. Fig.2(c) is the third PLGM extracted, the PGA values of the three are 474.58, 156.14, 406.04 cm/s², the PGVs of the three are 114.56, 75.10, 45.13 cm/s, and the CSV values of the three are 11921, 9486, 2435 cm²/s. It can be seen that each pulse has a large power. The sum of the CSV of the original ground motion of the three PLGMs is 33210 cm²/s, accounting for 57.7% of the total energy of the EW component of the original ISK002 data. The sum of CSV of the extracted pulses is 24548 cm²/s, accounting for 42.7% of the total energy of the EW component of the original ISK002 data.

2.4 Seismic intensity

It’s noteworthy that Japan uses its unique JMA intensity scale, divided into the following 10 levels: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5−, 5+, 6−, 6+, 7. Therefore, the intensity 7 produced by this earthquake is equivalent to an intensity of 10 or higher on United States Geological Survey (USGS) Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale. According to the report by the JMA [1], the 7.6 magnitude earthquake on the Noto Peninsula in Japan produced a high intensity distribution. The K-NET Fukui observation point in Shika Town, Ishikawa Prefecture, recorded an acceleration as high as 2681 gal. The maximum intensity, of 7 on the JMA intensity scale, was observed in Shika Town, Ishikawa Prefecture. The intensity in most areas of the Noto Peninsula was above 5 (JMA). The 2024 event is the seventh event since the 2018 Eastern Iburi earthquake in Hokkaido that an intensity of 7 has been recorded. Additionally, according to the Japanese Meteorological Agency report, this earthquake is the largest scale earthquake observed in the Noto region since 1885.

3 The 7.6 magnitude Noto Peninsula Earthquake, disaster overview

The 7.6 magnitude earthquake on the Noto Peninsula caused severe disasters, resulting in numerous casualties, extensive damage to houses, slope failures, damage to roads and railways, tsunami disasters, and fires, among others.

3.1 Casualties

According to reports from the Ishikawa Prefectural Government (The damage information in the 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake) [23], as of 14:00 on January 7, the 7.6 magnitude earthquake caused 128 deaths in Ishikawa Prefecture. The specific distribution was as follows: 69 in Wajima City, 38 in Suzu City, 5 in Nanao City, 11 in Anamizu Town, 2 each in Noto Town and Shika Town, and 1 in Hakui City. Additionally, there were still (on January 7) missing persons in Ishikawa Prefecture, and safety confirmation work was ongoing. A total of 560 people in Ishikawa Prefecture were injured, including both serious and minor injuries. This earthquake caused significant casualties in the region, becoming a tragedy in the history of Japanese disasters.

3.2 Housing damage

According to reports from the Ishikawa Prefectural Government, the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake caused severe damage to residential buildings in Ishikawa Prefecture, with 1305 houses completely or partially destroyed. Specific details are shown in Tab.1. The status of house damage in Wajima City, Suzu City, Uchinada Town, Noto Town, and other areas was still being compiled and their data are not yet available. The municipal governments initiated “emergency risk assessments”, urging residents severely affected by the disaster to evacuate on their own and considering using dormitories and other facilities as make-shift shelters.

3.3 Slope failure situations

According to data released by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan (MLIT) at 10:30 on January 7 (Damage and Response to the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake) [24], the earthquake caused 49 slope failures. These included 29 in Ishikawa Prefecture, 11 in Niigata Prefecture, and 9 in Toyama Prefecture, resulting in 14 deaths, 2 injuries, and 11 missing persons. The landslides completely destroyed 11 houses and partially damaged 3 others.

3.4 Road damage

According to information from the MLIT, multiple roads were affected by the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake. As of the morning of January 7, three sections of the Hokuriku Expressway were completely closed. In the national highways, National Route 8 in Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture, was closed due to a landslide in the Chaya-no-Hara section. Additionally, 29 sections of three auxiliary national highways experienced traffic disruptions. For prefectural and municipal roads, 70 sections in Ishikawa Prefecture, Niigata Prefecture, and Toyama Prefecture also experienced traffic disruptions. These road closures significantly impacted traffic flow and rescue efforts.

3.5 Railway impact

According to information from the MLIT, the earthquake had a severe impact on railways, mainly in the form of damage to roadbeds or tracks. As of 6:00 on January 3, multiple railway lines had experienced facility damage, including the JR East Echigo Line, JR West Takayama Line, Himi Line, Nanao Line, Oito Line, as well as the Toyama Chihō Railway Tateyama Line and the Hokuriku Railroad Asanogawa Line. To ensure safety, some railway lines were temporarily suspended, and detailed damage assessments were being conducted.

3.6 Fire incidents caused by the earthquake

According to reports from Japan Broadcasting Corporation NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai) (Status of victims 3 days after the Noto Earthquake) [25], the earthquake triggered a severe fire in the area around “Asaichi-dori” (Morning Market Street) in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture, with over 200 shops and residences burned down. 40 h after the fire outbreak, the site was still enveloped in white smoke, with the smell of char lingering. Local residents, including an 84-year-old woman, expressed shock and sorrow over the disaster. She described the scene as resembling a scorched battlefield after a war, unable to articulate her feelings.

4 Response measures

Following the earthquake, the Japanese government began disaster relief efforts, including collecting information on the scene, dispatching investigation teams to Kanazawa, conducting on-site rescue operations, and airlifting and shipping urgently needed supplies by sea. The Earthquake Research Committee of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion in Japan released a preliminary assessment the day after the earthquake. This included information on active fault distribution in the epicentral area, crustal deformation results, earthquake source fault models, and seismological observation data, providing foundational support for earthquake scientific research and disaster assessment.

In response to the tsunami generated by the earthquake, the JMA issued a tsunami warning 12 min after the earthquake, and subsequently, a 120 cm high tsunami was observed in Wajima. Two hours after the earthquake, the JMA briefed on the earthquake overview and countermeasures, announcing information about closures of expressways, suspension of railway services, air traffic control, etc., and reported ongoing investigations into slope, river, bridge, dam, coastal, and sewer damage. The day after the earthquake, three press conferences were held to provide timely updates on the collected disaster information and response situations, and a total of 11 detailed earthquake investigation reports had been released by 01:30 on January 7. Through live television broadcasts, the public was informed about the earthquake disaster, rescue process, and progress.

During the period from January 1 to January 7, the MLIT convened disaster countermeasure headquarters meetings and established local countermeasure headquarters in Ishikawa Prefecture. The ministry also established emergency contact lines with multiple regions and dispatched several professional teams, including TEC-FORCE, for disaster investigation and rescue. Helicopters were used for aerial inspections, and 92 disaster countermeasure machines, including drainage pump trucks and lighting vehicles, were deployed, effectively supporting the infrastructure and living needs of the disaster area. Additionally, by dispatching water trucks and other rescue equipment to various regions, the ministry effectively responded to the challenges brought by the disaster, demonstrating its efficiency and professionalism in disaster management.

The Japan Coast Guard deployed 20 patrol vessels and 5 aircraft for emergency rescue and material transport. They were primarily responsible for transporting urgently needed medical patients, police, and firefighters, as well as providing water resource support and conducting port safety investigations. The actions of the Coast Guard played a key role in ensuring the rescue and safety of the affected areas during the disaster.

The GSI held multiple disaster countermeasure headquarters meetings. They used aircraft to take aerial photographs and analyzed data from the “ALOS-2” satellite to monitor crustal movements and the earthquake source fault. The Geospatial Information Authority published these photos and data on their official website, including landslide distribution areas, tsunami inundation prediction areas, and the range of the fire in the center of Wajima City, providing important information for disaster assessment.

The National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, the Public Works Research Institute, the Building Research Institute, and the Port and Airport Research Institute convened several disaster countermeasure headquarters meetings and dispatched professionals for on-site investigations, including assessments of sediment control and structures such as bridges, roads, sewer systems, building structures, port facilities, and airport facilities.

5 Discussion and conclusions

This article provides a rapid introduction of the seismic source characteristics, disaster overview, and response measures of the 7.6 magnitude earthquake that struck the Noto Peninsula in Japan on January 1, 2024. The seismic source characteristics indicate that this earthquake was of the thrust-type, and was the largest in scale observed on the Noto Peninsula since 1885. The aftershocks mainly extended nearly 150 km in a north-east direction on both sides of the belt zone. The earthquake produced co-seismic displacements at the one meter level in the near field, and significant PGV and PGA were observed, with the earthquake intensity reaching over 10 (USGS intensity standard). In studying the earthquake’s seismic source characteristics and causes of destruction, it was found that the earthquake motion energy was concentrated in the area around the fault rupture, with the earthquake wave energy CSV significantly higher than other areas. This is closely related to the forward directivity effect of seismic motion propagation. High-energy strong seismic motions are more likely to cause catastrophic damage and should be given attention [14]. The high-energy characteristics of the seismic motion suggest that the region was affected by PLGM damage, but existing methods could not identify the pulse characteristics of the seismic motion. We extracted three strong pulses from the EW component of Shoin ISK002 and validated their PLGM characteristics even with existing methods. Therefore, the multiple strong pulse PLGM waveforms observed in this earthquake are a rare discovery, of great significance for earthquake engineering research. Identifying multiple strong pulse PLGM is a research topic that needs further exploration. Additionally, the causal mechanisms and evolutionary processes of the chain of disasters caused by the earthquake, including the collapse of houses, tsunamis, fires, slope failures, and road damage, also need further research and revelation. Moreover, the 7.6 magnitude earthquake on the Noto Peninsula in Japan not only caused serious economic losses and casualties locally but also posed new challenges to Japan’s disaster management and emergency response systems Researching the mechanism of this earthquake and emergency response measures is of great significance for the formulation of future earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation strategies, helping to enhance the capacity to respond to similar natural disasters.

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The Author(s). This article is published with open access at link.springer.com and journal.hep.com.cn