This paper examines the effects of a fall in the price of an imported good in a region of a country that is specialized in producing that good. The context is a “lumpy country” model in which factors are unable to move between locations, although in this case I assume that only labor is immobile, and that the other factor, capital, is perfectly mobile between regions. With mobile capital, the lumpy-country equilibrium can be anywhere in the factor-price equalization set, but my focus is on a region that initially produces only one good, on the border of that set. When the price of that good falls due to import competition, it would be possible for both factors to reallocate partially into production of the other good, but I assume instead that some capital simply leaves the region, so that it continues to produce only the same good that it did before. The result of this is a fall in the real wage of labor, just as under Stolper-Samuelson assumptions. I then look at production also of a non-traded good, and find that the same import competition that cheapened the traded good also cheapens the nontraded good. The result is that the region shrinks, losing capital and producing less of both goods unless the substitution in favor of the nontraded good expands its consumption out of a smaller income.
This paper uses a probabilistic voting model to investigate voting for a free-trade agreement between a labor-abundant country and a capital-abundant country. Migration from the labor-abundant country to the capital-abundant country increases the probability of a free-trade agreement, with lower migration costs leading to more migration and a higher free-trade probability. On the other hand, if a lower probability of free trade is caused by an increased voter bias against free-trade candidates, then there is less migration. A dynamic extension of the model is also investigated.
This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North-South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.
A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.
This paper examines global value chains at the level of the heterogeneous firm. The context is a world of horizontal intra-industry trade, characterized by imperfect competition and product differentiation at the firm level. Standard microeconomic tools are employed to assess the effects of inter-firm dissimilarities in both demand and supply on firms’ responses to changes in trade policy. In this set-up, dissimilarities in firm characteristics play roles similar to factor endowments and technology differences in traditional trade models. When cross-border production sharing (“fragmentation”) is introduced into this framework, those differences in firm characteristics determine the degree to which individual firms will enter into production networks. In this context, horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade elements interact in their effects on firm decisions. Traditional comparative advantage considerations still govern the choice of off-shored activities, while direct competition between imports and exports expands the range of possible outcomes. Finally, it is shown that cross-border production sharing reduces the sensitivity of firms to variations in exchange rates, matching a phenomenon that has been observed in traditional country-level models.
This note is an effort to view the research program of Brecher and his co-workers to deploy tax incentives against involuntary unemployment in the broader context; on both the equity-efficiency trade-off in political economy, and the dual economic structure in the theoretic foundations of market equilibrium.
We investigate the impact of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) on Canadian exports to Chile, particularly the dynamic effects of the agreement on extensive and intensive margins of trade. Consistent with the literature, we find that the extensive margin effects occurred later than the intensive margin effects and became more prominent in the long-term. Surprisingly, the intensive margin effects died off in the long-term. A theoretical model is constructed to show that our results can arise in a standard setting of intra-industry trade.
Using Chinese manufacturing data between 1998 and 2007, this paper investigates the impact of agglomeration on firm’s export behavior. It is found that the agglomeration of manufacturing industries in China over this period increases firm’s export probability as well as its export volume, and the impact is larger for more efficient firms. However, the impact on firm’s export volume depends on the degree of agglomeration. When the degree of agglomeration is low, an increase in agglomeration would expand firm’s export volume but the impact will be diminishing and even turns negative if the degree of agglomeration is already very high.