Managerial Power, Perquisite Consumption and the Efficiency of Property Right System: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

Rui Lu, Minghai Wei, Wenjing Li

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PDF(502 KB)
Front. Bus. Res. China ›› 2010, Vol. 4 ›› Issue (3) : 360-379. DOI: 10.1007/s11782-010-0102-3
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Managerial Power, Perquisite Consumption and the Efficiency of Property Right System: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

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Abstract

This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2001– 2004 to test the effects of managerial power on perquisite consumption and firm performance from the perspectives of CEO duality, ownership dispersion and long-term tenure of top executives. Results show that companies with higher managerial power tend to incur higher perquisite consumption, while their performance does not improve accordingly. Moreover, perquisite consumption fails to offer effective incentives to managers, and non-state-controlled listed companies have greater managerial power, higher perquisite consumption, and worse performance than that of their state-controlled peers. Results also show that managerial power is an important factor influencing compensation incentive.

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managerial power / perquisite consumption / performance / property right

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Rui Lu, Minghai Wei, Wenjing Li. Managerial Power, Perquisite Consumption and the Efficiency of Property Right System: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Front Bus Res Chin, 2010, 4(3): 360‒379 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0102-3

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2014 Higher Education Press and Brill
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