Users’ Bidding Behavior for Blockchain Transaction Service under Congestion: Evidence from Ethereum

Abstract

In the context of permissionless blockchains, users participate in bidding for transaction services, resembling an online auction. While past research highlights congestion’s positive impact on bidding prices in traditional online auctions, blockchain’s unique characteristics (i.e., congestion-induced low service quality and data transparency) may alter user responses to congestion. Analyzing extensive Ethereum transaction data, this study explores the impact of congestion on users’ bidding prices and its boundary conditions in terms of user behavioral features-prior experience, wealth, and variety-seeking tendencies for service types. Results indicate that congestion continues to positively impact users’ bidding prices in the blockchain context. This effect is more pronounced among wealthier users and those with lower variety-seeking tendencies. Surprisingly, contrary to prior research, user experience is found to increase their bidding price, which may be driven by the experienced users’ private information that lower prices may result in extremely long waiting times. This research extends the understanding of users’ bidding behavior to the realm of blockchain and provides valuable insights into the dynamics of congestion in the blockchain context. We provide practical implications for both blockchain platform operators and users.

Keywords

Online auction / congestion / blockchain transaction fee / bidding decision / user heterogeneity

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