The industrial internet holds immense potential for optimizing idle manufacturing services and driving a new wave of industrial transformation. To ensure its sustainable development requires a deep understanding of the collaborative dynamics among stakeholders and the factors shaping their strategic decisions. While previous research has examined stakeholder behavior within the industrial internet ecosystem, few studies have addressed the critical roles of government subsidies and perception biases—both of which are key in practice. This paper aims to bridge this gap and offer insights for the effective development of the industrial internet. To achieve this, we propose a tripartite evolutionary game model involving manufacturing service suppliers, requesters, and the industrial internet platform, grounded in Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting. We analyze the stability of equilibrium points and explore the effects of various factors, including the benefits of manufacturing service sharing, transaction fees, unmatching compensations, government subsidies, and reference points for benefits and costs, through simulation experiments. Our findings reveal that increasing the benefits of manufacturing service sharing and unmatching compensations, adjusting government subsidies, and reducing transaction fees can encourage greater participation from suppliers and requesters while motivating platforms to offer high-quality services. Furthermore, refining reference points by increasing the cost reference point and decreasing the valence reference point can help guide the system toward an optimal equilibrium. These insights provide practical recommendations for stakeholders, enabling them to design more effective strategies to foster the growth of the industrial internet ecosystem.

Consumer electronics firms like Apple and Xiaomi adopt a “main product + complementary product” business operation mode (e.g., Apple Pencil for iPad). Interestingly, upgrades in main products and complementary products often unsynchronized, while cooperating with a specialized third-party firm seems to facilitate complementary product’s upgrade. Generally, the focal firm faces a long-term cooperation decision (i.e., whether to partner with a third-party firm for complementary product), and a relatively short-term upgrade decision (i.e., whether to upgrade complementary product simultaneously with main product). We construct a two-stage theoretical model to investigate the optimal upgrade and cooperation strategies for complementary product and the interaction mechanism, considering the value-added degree and the third-party firm’s cost advantage. Our findings indicate that upgrading complementary products hurts focal firm when the value-added degree of complementary product is high. Due to excessive bargaining power, the partnership prevents the upgrades unless when the value-added degree is high. Additionally, we find that a delicate balance, depending on the value-added degree, between cost-reduction effect and erosion effect in determining optimal cooperation strategy. Moreover, we demonstrate that firm’s profit and environmental sustainability can achieve a win-win outcome. We also find that the ability to determine value-added degree may instead prevent the upgrade and cooperation.

Blockchain technology has the capacity to facilitate a circular food economy by mitigating food loss and waste (FLW) within the perishable supply chain (PSC) while aligning with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Utilizing the Fuzzy Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (Fuzzy DEMATEL) method, this study conducts a comprehensive analysis of blockchain-driven enablers vital for FLW reduction. The findings underscore the critical importance of Transparency and Traceability (TAT) as the most influential enabler, essential for enhancing food safety, reducing FLW, and promoting sustainable consumption and production (SDGs 2 and 12). Smart Contracts (SC) follow closely, automating processes, improving supply chain efficiency, and contributing to food security (SDGs 2 and 9). Regulatory Compliance (RC) ensures adherence to food safety and traceability regulations, directly impacting food security and responsible production (SDGs 2 and 12). Consumer Engagement (CE) empowers consumers and encourages responsible consumption, a core principle of a circular food economy (SDG 12). Digital Identity Verification (DIV) and IoT Integration (ITI) enhance sustainability and real-time environmental monitoring, supporting the principles of a circular economy, particularly climate action (SDG 13). While Decentralization (DC), Interoperability (IP), and Sustainability Metrics (SM) have broader supply chain implications, their indirect impact on the circular economy is substantial. Future research directions include exploring enabler integration, technological advancements, cross-sectoral collaboration, and robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for FLW reduction within the circular food economy. Disseminating knowledge, emphasizing policy implications, and addressing regional variations are crucial steps in realizing the potential of blockchain-enabled FLW reduction and SDG alignment in the circular food economy.

In the context of permissionless blockchains, users participate in bidding for transaction services, resembling an online auction. While past research highlights congestion’s positive impact on bidding prices in traditional online auctions, blockchain’s unique characteristics (i.e., congestion-induced low service quality and data transparency) may alter user responses to congestion. Analyzing extensive Ethereum transaction data, this study explores the impact of congestion on users’ bidding prices and its boundary conditions in terms of user behavioral features-prior experience, wealth, and variety-seeking tendencies for service types. Results indicate that congestion continues to positively impact users’ bidding prices in the blockchain context. This effect is more pronounced among wealthier users and those with lower variety-seeking tendencies. Surprisingly, contrary to prior research, user experience is found to increase their bidding price, which may be driven by the experienced users’ private information that lower prices may result in extremely long waiting times. This research extends the understanding of users’ bidding behavior to the realm of blockchain and provides valuable insights into the dynamics of congestion in the blockchain context. We provide practical implications for both blockchain platform operators and users.

This paper examines the optimal decisions on operations and financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer selling two different quality levels of products through an online dual-channel. The manufacturer can mitigate financial constrains by leveraging either e-commerce platform financing or bank financing.The Stackelberg game models are established under both financing modes to analyze the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform. Additionally, the study explores the effects of financing interest rates and product quality differences on equilibrium outcomes in the online dual-channel. The findings reveal the following: (i) As financing interest rates increase, total product sales decline. While product prices may rise, this does not necessarily intensify price competition within the online dual-channel. (ii) When the e-commerce platform’s financing rate exceeds the bank rate, the manufacturer sets higher direct sales prices. Beyond a specific threshold, distribution prices rise, and total sales decrease. (iii) When consumers are indifferent to the two online channels, the manufacturer will distribute high-quality products under both financing modes at high interest rates, more lenient condition under e-commerce financing. (iv) When the financing interest rates of the e-commerce platform and the bank are the same, the manufacturer prefers e-commerce financing for distributing high-quality products, but opts for bank financing when directly selling high-quality products with a significant quality gap.