In applied ethics, principlism demonstrates an approach to applying ethical principles to specific practices. Unlike proponents of deductivism, which relies on a moral system based on a supreme principle with universal applicability, and those of casuistry, which depends on analogical evaluation based on perceptual judgment, principle ethicists seek middle-level principles that bridge abstract moral theories and concrete moral practices. These principles provide a normative framework with value standards and argumentative foundations for addressing ethical conflicts. While non-maleficence, beneficence, justice, and autonomy are considered as traditional ethical principles, human rights, dignity, privacy, and responsibility have emerged as widely recognized modern ethical principles. The middlelevel principles in applied ethics are self-evident in nature, fundamentally rooted in human moral intuition. These principles maintain a coherent and coordinated relationship, requiring specific interpretation and flexible weighting according to different contexts in practice.
The consciousness of sharing fostered by the digitizing transformation and development in society has overturned the economic ethical assumptions built upon the consciousness of ownership. The widespread utilization of intelligent machines and artificial agents has presented challenges to labor ethics. Furthermore, the subtle persuasion and manipulation of humans by technologies, such as algorithms, along with the technologization of both the human body and mind have made it challenging to adapt to principles such as fairness, justice, autonomy, and voluntariness. These changes have introduced new potential ethical risks, obscuring the distinction between private and public spaces, transforming cognitive practices into ethical ones, and elevating accountability to a new topic that connects epistemology, ethics, and ontology. Our actions, perceptions, intentions, and morality have become intertwined with modern information technology. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a new ethical framework based on the relational self, consciousness of sharing, leisure labor, and subversion of various dichotomous concepts. This signifies the initiation of the second process of “a man as a human being.”
A correct comprehension of the human-machine relationship in the age of intelligence is essential for preventing ethical risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), and the comprehension of the ethical nature of the human-machine relationship delineates a boundary between humanism and technocracy. From the ethical perspective of humanism, mankind’s ethical world will not be subverted despite the presence of super AI, as human relations, ethical laws, and ethical orders are “exclusive” to mankind. While robots may “participate” in social ethical life through preset programs inside them, this does not qualify them as true ethical subjects. Furthermore, robots will not bear ethical responsibility given its basic provisions, as they lack the capability for self-awareness or the ability to explain their actions. Human beings bear full responsibility for AI, rather than simply sharing this responsibility. When we speak of strengthening the ethics of robots, we refer not to the ethics of machines, but to the ethics involved in mankind’s design, development, application, and operation of intelligent robots. Adhering to humanistic ethics is essential for discussing AI ethics, as it helps avoid ambiguity and confusion in comprehension.
Algorithms are strategy mechanisms and run programs based on data as the basic resource, aimed at solving problems and completing tasks. They serve as the “nervous centralis” and “soul” of artificial intelligence (AI), but they are not “value-neutral.” When data is collected, stored, and analyzed with technologies such as machine learning for automated decision-making, the standpoint of the one who designs and writes algorithms, the source and accuracy of data supporting and training the algorithms, and the value load and value selection intrinsic to the algorithms, as well as the behavioral tendency of specific value subjects based on the algorithms and the independent evaluation and decision-making of intelligent systems, may all lead to a certain degree of algorithmic discrimination, ultimately affecting the realization of social justice. Compared with the social discrimination familiar to people, algorithmic discrimination is more extensive, diversified, accurate, targeted, concealed, and “cunning.” As we advance the intelligent transformation of society, it is essential to establish the status of all people as value subjects, “embed” the values of justice into intelligent algorithms, and establish dynamic evaluation and supervision mechanisms. Only through these actions can we make necessary regulations on algorithmic discrimination and reconstruct a just social order in the era of intelligence.
In the big data era, data has become a core element in biomedicine, with extensive applications across fields such as biogenomics, clinical medicine, and biobanks. These shifts bring new opportunities and severe challenges for Bioethics research. The opportunities are manifested in expanding the scope of bioethics from a focus on “individual good” to the “public good,” fostering a transition from purely qualitative or quantitative approaches to interdisciplinary integration, and enhancing bioethical governance from “Monhism” to “pluralism.” However, challenges also arise, such as the potential misalignment between data analysis and real bioethical issues, the risk of bioethics succumbing to dataism, and a lack of awareness and expertise regarding big data within the field. This dual situation highlights the trends and dilemmas facing bioethics research in the era of big data, which warrant the attention of contemporary bioethics scholars.
The driving force behind the development of bioethics stems from a concern for the weak or vulnerability. Mainstream bioethics advocates understanding vulnerability within the context of autonomy, interpreting it as a lack or reduction of autonomy, and emphasizing the protection of special vulnerable groups. Critics question the rationality of this traditional model, arguing that interpreting vulnerability with the context of autonomy in bioethics not only ignores the universal vulnerability of humanity but also easily dilutes social responsibility. In fact, in the real-life picture of humanity, autonomy and vulnerability are always intertwined. With a proper understanding of autonomy, bioethics can still effectively interpret vulnerability within the context of autonomy. However, bioethics requires a holistic theory of vulnerability that emphasizes the protection of particularly vulnerable groups while embracing the broad, universal vulnerability of humankind.
Contemporary ecological ethics faces a narrative dilemma of how to narrate the moralities of non-human living entities. Western ecological narratives, which emphasize human- or nature-centered perspectives, tend to reduce the symbiotic relationship between humans and all living entities to a mechanical object relationship of either/or, which is neither in accordance with humanity nor aligned with the purpose of nature. Confucian ecological ethics, rooted in the fundamental spirit of “the unity of Heaven and man,” approaches the narrative from the perspective of the human conscience narrating the universe, using the logic of narrating material virtues through human benevolence. The narrative contents present a natural humanistic discourse characterized by the continuous and interactive interplay of “gained from Heaven and achieved through benevolence.” Methodologically, Confucianism narrates the transcendental “higher-level understanding” with the daily experience of “studying concrete things,” linking the unique value of humans as “the heart of Heaven and Earth” with the conscious responsibility of humans to “ordain conscience for Heaven and Earth,” thereby achieving a narrative effect that aligns with both the purposes humanity and nature. This approach helps to mitigate the internal “center” dispute within ecological ethics, integrate factual descriptions with value judgments, and construct a proactive humanistic practice theory through a positive temporal lens, thereby avoiding a negative, passive moral reductionism.
“Eco-environmental governance” refers to a dynamic process of translating environmental governance knowledge into practice. Ethical governance of the ecoenvironment serves as an important link that facilitates the transition from environmental governance cognition to concrete implementation. The discussion on the ethical governance of the environment has been ongoing for a long time. However, reaching a consensus within the academic community remains challenging, and some scholars still question its rationality. From the perspective of Marxist environmental governance, “eco-environmental governance” refers to a governance system composed of the subject, content, and methodology of environmental governance. Accordingly, the rationality of ethical governance of the ecoenvironment should be analyzed based on the three most fundamental elements. Regarding the environmental governance subject, the dual existence of individual “ethical beings” and the collective “ethical community” indicates the possibility of the ethical governance subject in the eco-environment. In terms of the environmental governance object, a dual predicament of “ethical disorder” in the social sphere and “moral absence” in the natural sphere determines the inevitability of ethical governance content in the eco-environment. As for environmental governance means, the “ethical guidance” at the mind level and “ethical regulation” at the behavioral level prove the necessity of the ethical governance method in the eco-environment.
Based on the social identity theory, this paper analyzes the questionnaires collected from 405 employees in two stages to explore the mechanism of influence of Confucian ethical leadership on employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior. The results show that Confucian ethical leadership negatively affects employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior; ethical identity serves an intermediary role between Confucian moral leadership and employees’ unethical pro-organizational behavior; the superior-subordinate relationship not only positively regulates the relationship between Confucian ethical leadership and moral identity, but also further regulates the intermediary effect of moral identity.
The concept of a good death is an important issue that ethics should focus on. With the rise of individualism, medical practices have undergone subtle changes, and Western bioethics has begun to consider, from a subjective perspective, which normative conditions constitute a good death. In contrast, the traditional Confucian view of shanzhong 善终 (good ending) emphasizes the unity of life and death and the transcendence of death from an objective perspective, regarding the moral value of living a good life as the moral requirement for judging a good death. By fully acknowledging the historical changes in the concept of death, we can facilitate a dialogue between these two perspectives, enriching each other and helping modern individuals attain a more comprehensive and morally desirable understanding of death.