research-article

Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?

  • HUANG Xiang
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  • School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China

Published date: 05 Sep 2013

Copyright

2014 Higher Education Press and Brill

Abstract

Jan Almäng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Almäng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.

Cite this article

HUANG Xiang . Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2013 , 8(3) : 485 -497 . DOI: 10.3868/s030-002-013-0038-2

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