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Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?
Published date: 05 Sep 2013
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Jan Almäng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Almäng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.
Key words: perceptual content; affordance; John McDowell; Jan Almäng
HUANG Xiang . Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2013 , 8(3) : 485 -497 . DOI: 10.3868/s030-002-013-0038-2
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