Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?
HUANG Xiang
Front. Philos. China ›› 2013, Vol. 8 ›› Issue (3) : 485 -497.
Does Conditional Affordance Imply Representational Non-Conceptual Content?
Jan Almäng believes that James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances offers a reason to reject John McDowell’s thesis that representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. I argue that Almäng’s arguments for the claim that the perceptual content in which conditional affordances feature can be both representational and non-conceptual are questionable.
perceptual content / affordance / John McDowell / Jan Almäng
Higher Education Press and Brill
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