research-article

On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis

  • XU Zhaoqing
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  • Department of Philosophy, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China

Published date: 19 Jun 2015

Copyright

2014 Higher Education Press and Brill

Abstract

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.

Cite this article

XU Zhaoqing . On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2015 , 10(2) : 298 -310 . DOI: 10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1

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