On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis

XU Zhaoqing

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PDF(270 KB)
Front. Philos. China ›› 2015, Vol. 10 ›› Issue (2) : 298-310. DOI: 10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1
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On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis

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Abstract

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.

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dogmatism paradox / epistemic closure / knowledge attribution / relevant alternatives / public retraction logic

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XU Zhaoqing. On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(2): 298‒310 https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-004-015-0022-1

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2014 Higher Education Press and Brill
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