Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action

XU Zhu,

PDF(218 KB)
PDF(218 KB)
Front. Philos. China ›› 2010, Vol. 5 ›› Issue (2) : 280-293. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-010-0016-3
Research articles

Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action

  • XU Zhu,
Author information +
History +

Abstract

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper–Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.

Keywords

intentional explanation / causality / laws of nature / philosophy of the social sciences

Cite this article

Download citation ▾
XU Zhu,. Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Front. Philos. China, 2010, 5(2): 280‒293 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-010-0016-3
PDF(218 KB)

Accesses

Citations

Detail

Sections
Recommended

/