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Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation
of Action
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Center for Science Technology
and Society, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
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Published |
05 Jun 2010 |
Issue Date |
05 Jun 2010 |
Abstract
Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper–Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.
Keywords
intentional explanation /
causality /
laws of nature /
philosophy of the social sciences
Cite this article
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XU Zhu,.
Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation
of Action. Front. Philos. China, 2010, 5(2): 280‒293 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-010-0016-3
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