THE ASYMMETRY OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM AND CHINESE STRATEGY: IN WHAT WAYS DO THE SYSTEM AND RESULTS FAVOR COMPLAINANTS?

Abstract

By referring to 400 WTO cases, this paper reviews the results of WTO dispute settlement proceedings and the systemic causes in order to find out whether the WTO dispute settlement system’s results reflect a clear tendency of favoring complainants, and if so, whether the internal asymmetry of the system leads to such results. Based on these findings, and by considering a number of factors, this paper analyses the influence on national interests brought about by such asymmetry, so as to find whether there is a two-way adjustment effect and relative deprivation effect for developing countries. Then, according to the current economic situations of the WTO’s Asian countries, this paper suggests that the Asian members should reform their policies to overcome the disadvantages of the WTO asymmetric proceedings. In this part, this paper comprehensively evaluates the measure of actively using the WTO dispute settlement system that favors the complainants, in order to develop overseas markets and realize potential benefits of treaty negotiations.

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Higher Education Press and Thomson Reuters