In the last three decades of its rule, the Qing government attempted to establish Chinese-style administration in many of the empire’s non-Han territories, and, in conjunction with non-government actors, foster land cultivation, Han migration, Chinese education, and industries such as mining. This paper investigates these processes in Liangshan, in upland Southwest China. Here, attempts to establish Chinese administration came only in 1907, after a period of substantial private and state investment in mining, transport infrastructure, and, to a lesser extent, land cultivation. Government officials often assumed that such things would aid the political integration in China, but as this paper argues, the consequences were more complicated than that. Although better transport simplified the logistics of government military campaigns, increased commercial activity in the region also allowed its indigenes to acquire firearms for the first time.
This study of the introduction of telegraphy to China in the late-nineteenth century tells three interrelated stories: China’s pursuit of telegraphic sovereignty with its strategic networking of the empire in the period 1881–99; the functioning of China’s hybrid express courier-telegraphic communications infrastructure; and the international communications crisis during the Boxer Uprising and the “Siege of the Legations” in 1900. The material reality of two inter-connected networks—the privately owned Imperial Telegraph Administration network and the government-run telegraph network—allowed Qing-era Beijing and its provincial governors to communicate with much greater speed. The materiality of these networks—how this new communications technology affected the practical realities of government communications, including the ease of lateral communications between provincial governors—is explored in the context of the communications crisis of 1900. In May and June of 1900 all telegraph lines to Beijing, and throughout much of North China, were cut or otherwise destroyed. While these blinded Western governments are no longer able to exchange telegrams with their Beijing-based envoys, the Qing express courier system continued to operate. Moreover, both the court and provincial officials quickly improvised ad hoc telegraphic communication protocols through the use of “transfer telegrams” (zhuandian) that relied on mounted express couriers between Beijing and those North China telegraph stations with working network connections. This assessment of real-time secret imperial communications between the Qing court and the provinces is based on the documentary register Suishou dengji (Records of [documents] at hand) maintained by communications managers in the Grand Council. China lost its telegraphic sovereignty in the capital region when Allied troops occupied the Beijing-Tianjin line of communications in the summer and fall of 1900. Moreover, Western dreams of laying, landing, and controlling submarine cables on the China coast were finally realized in North China by the end of 1900. The British, therefore, were able to add a critical section to their planned global network of secure telegraphic communications. China’s recognition of the Western and Japanese right of protecting the Beijing-Tianjin line of communications was codified in Article 9 of the Boxer Protocol of September 1901. These losses of China’s telegraphic sovereignty would not be completely reversed until after 1949.
The introduction of Western science in order to change physical and operational aspects of Shanghai’s Huangpu River had been debated by Qing and Western officials since almost the beginning of its history as a Treaty Port. At stake in those debates was the perception of the river’s proper use: as a natural barrier for military defense, or as a conduit for global trade. After the Western powers unified to militarily suppress the Boxer Uprising in 1900, they attained their long-awaited goal of the right to transform the river for global trade as part of Article 11 of the Boxer Protocol: the Junpuju (or Huangpu Conservancy Board) was created and authorized by the central government to make the Huangpu River navigable for shipping vessels. Although the Junpuju continued the ethos of earlier extra-bureaucratic organizations established during the Self-Strengthening Movement, after 1901 the organization bore the authority of the central government. During the era of the New Policies, Qing officials were intent on revising the original terms of river conservancy so that they would be more favorable to Chinese sovereignty. At the same time, imperialist rivalries among the Western powers ruptured the apparent unity of the earlier alliance during the suppression of the Boxer Uprising. Before long, Western corruption in the Huangpu River dredging was brought to the attention of Qing officials, who deftly used it to recover Qing control over certain parts of the body of the river.
This article contributes to a wider critique of the use of European capitalist, patterns of industrialization in studies of the economic history of modern China—patterns commonly assumed to be universally valid. This sort of analytical framework denies not only the value of alternative economic models, but also that of Chinese independent economic thought. In this context, the present article argues that most of the intellectual changes of seventeenth-century Europe that led to the formulation of liberal capitalism—resistance to government intervention, support for luxury consumption as well as a new understanding of the market and of the relationship between private interests and morality—had taken place in China more than a century earlier. The background against which the two processes emerged, however, varied significantly, leading to distinctive ramifications. Unprecedented population growth and a widening gap between hinterland and coastal economies led Chinese officials and intellectuals to discard ideas of free market and focus instead on solutions for increasing production, maximizing the circulation of resources, and fighting poverty. It was not, therefore, a lack of a “scientific” understanding of the economy that led China to turn away from European-style laissez fare, but rather an evaluation of the Empire’s circumstances, raising questions on whether the European model is indeed universally applicable regardless of local conditions.
Love-suicide (xunqing 殉情) is often hailed as a representative component of the Naxi culture. This article examines how representations of love-suicide have transformed from an obscure social taboo to an invaluable Naxi tradition in the last two decades. While Han and Naxi cultural elites aestheticize love-suicide as a cultural symbol of moral sublimity, tourists further transform the discourse into a simultaneously spiritual and erotic experience in which they seek and create their own existential authenticity. The apparent revival is not simply a result of Naxi political resistance to the external regime or a natural return to their “authentic” culture. It rather marks another tide of radical transformation in a multi-agent and highly commercialized global world within which both minority cultures and tourists’ identities are transformed.