Information is the basis for decision-making in all dynasties, particularly for national politics. Issues related to preventing blockages, uncovering the truth, and developing the yanlu 言路, or “channels for arising criticisms and opinions,” are always at the center of focus. In a broad sense, the yanlu refers to the institutionalized channels through which information from the lower levels reaches the upper authorities in a traditional society. In a narrow sense, it specifically denotes the pathways for officials to present messages and opinions to the emperor. This paper focuses on the Song court’s institutional ways of obtaining information and how they actually worked. Behind the various manifestations lie the intentions of the policymakers and the inherent mechanisms of the bureaucratic system. The operational realities of the institutions also reflect the prevailing institutional culture of the time.
During the reign of Emperor Taizu of the Song Dynasty, the private imperial banquets were effectively employed to unify various political forces, cultivate a harmonious relationship characterized by shared happiness between the emperor and his ministers, and tackle challenging problems. The main attendees of these banquets comprised three groups, namely military commanders, Military Commissioners, royal families of various kingdoms, and Grand Councilor and close ministers, each serving distinct purposes and possessing unique characteristics. The banquets for military commanders were designed to serve both rewarding and controlling objectives. In addition, they aimed to provide reassurance for the Military Commissioners and royal families while simultaneously instilling fear. Moreover, banquets held for Grand Councilor and close ministers primarily functioned as an extension or supplement to court discussions. Throughout the process of reestablishing centralized rule, curbing Military Commissioners, and eliminating regional regimes under Emperor Taizu’s rule, the banquets played an irreplaceable political role. These all made private imperial banquets one of the important means of governance adopted by Emperor Taizu, which highlighted the distinctive pragmatic features of his reign.
The State Councilors at the Secretariat-Chancellery in the early Northern Song period generally started work during the Mao 卯 hour (at around 6:00) and did not finish until the Wei 未 hour (at around 14:00), resulting in a workday of about eight hours. According to where and how they did their work, their working schedule can be divided into five stages: waiting for the morning audience in the Dailou Hall, having an audience with the emperor, deliberating affairs in the Administration Chamber, handling work in respective agencies, and gathering again in the Administration Chamber. Everything was in order and the schedule was tight. This reflects a high standard of administrative management and institutional development, as well as the considerable work stress suffered by the State Councilors at the time.
During the Xining era of the Northern Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi asserted that a sage king or a wise emperor “did not change his plan because of this outcry, for he considered it correct,” with a view to countering the opposition and reinforcing the determination of Emperor Shenzong for the Reforms. He believed that any political action which benefits people inevitably came with some minor harm and often shortsighted people and the typically treacherous or ignorant scholar-officials tend to question and obstruct the actions conforming to the Way based on these minor harms. Therefore, Emperor Shenzong should not be constrained by the opposition’s rhetoric that claims to represent “public discussion,” but should steadfastly implement the New Policies and severely punish dissenters. Wang Anshi frequently cited and interpreted Book of Documents to substantiate his thoughts and discourse, reflecting the significant and unique role that Book of Documents played in the thoughts and practices regarding Wang Anshi’s Reforms. Meanwhile, the scholar-officials opposing the New Policies adopted different interpretative approaches to express and argue their dissent, leading to numerous conflicts and “dialogues” regarding the interpretations on Book of Documents between the two sides.
In the Southern Song Dynasty, powerful ministers came to prominence in succession. Qin Hui served two terms as Grand Councilor for 19 years, while Han Tuozhou, Shi Miyuan, and Jia Sidao controlled the imperial government for a long time. As these ministers sought to control the appointments and dismissals of imperial edict drafters, the imperial edicts, which were meant to reflect the emperor’s will, gradually became tools for achieving their purposes with flattery or aggressive language. The imperial edict drafters not only had the duty to convey the emperor’s will in the writing of edicts but also needed to reflect impartiality and factual accuracy in their advocacy. While powerful ministers had a significant impact on the Southern Song politics, the scholar-officials’ commitment to maintaining the “rules of the founding emperor” allowed these officials to retain a political status that enabled their involvement in decision-making and to uphold public discourse. This dynamic, to some extent, created a balance of power between the emperor and the Grand Councilors. The writing of imperial edicts distinctly showcased the political competition among the emperor, powerful ministers, and the imperial edict drafters, shedding light on the trends and evolution of scholar-official politics in the Song Dynasty.
By exploring two parts of the concept of Grand Councilor in the Tang and Song dynasties, this paper proposes two ideal types of the monarchical domination in imperial China. Tongdian by Du You and Outstanding Models from the Storehouse of Literature compiled in 1013 present two essential elements in the concept of Grand Councilor. First, the Grand Councilor referred to the members of the Privy Group (Shuji, 枢机), the monarch’s private advisors who gave confidential advice on state affairs. Second, the Grand Councilor also served as the Supreme Overseer (Zongtong, 总统), the head of officials and bureaucracy. Among the two elements, the role of the Privy Group was more fundamental to the concept of Grand Councilor. In practice, the monarchs’ Privy Group included not only Grand Councilors but also Academicians, eunuchs, and imperial favorites. Together, they constituted the pivot for the domination of monarchs in the Tang and Northern Song dynasties. The direct rule through the Privy Group system and the Entrustment system through Supreme Overseer constituted two ideal types of the monarchical domination models in imperial China.
Since the advent of the 21st century, historical research on the Song Dynasty in China has exhibited notable new characteristics distinct from the past trends in terms of research landscape, documentation and research, postgraduate training, research orientations, research questions, and methodologies. These developments merit consideration. Concurrently, a renewed appreciation of the historical significance of the Song Dynasty, the reflection on the rise of the Naitō Hypothesis in Japan, and increasing calls for the study of the “Grand Song History” all indicate a new phase of in-depth development in the historical research on the Song Dynasty.