The Fable of the Public Welfare Competition Recorded in Han Feizi and Its Implied “Public Opinion Theory”

Abstract

The fable in the “Outer Congeries of Sayings: The Upper Right Series” of Han Feizi about the public welfare competition between Duke Jing of Qi and his imperial clan members and powerful officials contains the concept that people can choose their rulers through peaceful means. In other words, those who desire to gain ruling power would compete in public welfare and win by obtaining greater support from the people. This concept is significantly different from the Changing of the Mandate of Heaven in the Ages of Tang and Wu and other claims that rely on violent actions to implement people’s will. Although Han Fei opposed this concept, it provides a unique design or imagination of implementing the “popular opinion theory” during the pre-Qin period (before 221 BC). The views on the public opinion theory in early texts such as the Book of Documents and the Confucian and Mencian schools of thought may be regarded as the basis or source of the aforementioned design. This design is rooted in social conditions such as the traditional system of enfeoffment (fenfeng) and the traditional military system of integrating the army and people (bing min heyi) in the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BCE) but declined with the transformation of the social structure during the period of Warring States (403-221BCE) and Qin (221-206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE-220) dynasties, and was almost forgotten. From this perspective, the early public opinion theories, including the fable of public welfare, were not initially some kind of pedantic utopianism.

Keywords

Han Feizi, public welfare, competition, popular opinion theory

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