Modeling and assessing international climate financing

Abstract

Climate financing is a key issue in current negotiations on climate protection. This study establishes a climate financing model based on a mechanism in which donor countries set up funds for climate financing and recipient countries use the funds exclusively for carbon emission reduction. The burden-sharing principles are based on GDP, historical emissions, and consumption-based emissions. Using this model, we develop and analyze a series of scenario simulations, including a financing program negotiated at the Cancun Climate Change Conference (2010) and several subsequent programs. Results show that sustained climate financing can help to combat global climate change. However, the Cancun Agreements are projected to result in a reduction of only 0.01°C in global warming by 2100 compared to the scenario without climate financing. Longer-term climate financing programs should be established to achieve more significant benefits. Our model and simulations also show that climate financing has economic benefits for developing countries. Developed countries will suffer a slight GDP loss in the early stages of climate financing, but the long-term economic growth and the eventual benefits of climate mitigation will compensate for this slight loss. Different burden-sharing principles have very similar effects on global temperature change and economic growth of recipient countries, but they do result in differences in GDP changes for Japan and the FSU. The GDP-based principle results in a larger share of financial burden for Japan, while the historical emissions-based principle results in a larger share of financial burden for the FSU. A larger burden share leads to a greater GDP loss.

Keywords

integrated assessment / financial viability / climate change policies / burden sharing / emissions reduction

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