Non-cooperative optimization games in market-oriented overlay networks: an integrated model of resource pricing and network formation

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate a non-cooperative optimization game in market-oriented overlay networks where participating peers share their own computing resources to earn virtual money called energy. We model an overlay network as a set of non-cooperative resource providing peers, called platforms, that perform resource pricing and topology management to maximize their own energy gains. Resource consuming peers, called agents, are simply designed to migrate platform-to-platform to find the least expensive resources in the network. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the market dynamics as well as the global properties of the network, i.e., resource price and network topology, that emerge from local interactions among the group of peers.

Keywords

Overlay networks / market mechanisms / non-cooperative games / mobile agents

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Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the Nakajima Foundation, and Kayamori Foundation of Informational Science Advancement , and KAKENHI 23650028.

RIGHTS & PERMISSIONS

2014 Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg