Security analysis of two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols

Abstract

Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems suffer many security risks because they use an insecure wireless communication channel between tag and reader. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols. Both protocols are vulnerable to tag information leakage and untraceability attacks. For the attack on the first protocol, the adversary only needs to eavesdrop on the messages between reader and tag, and then perform an XOR operation. To attack the second protocol successfully, the adversary may execute a series of carefully designed challenges to determine the tag’s identification.

Keywords

radio frequency identification (RFID) protocol / tag information leakage / untraceability attack

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 60772136, 61003300), the 111 Development Program of China (B08038), the Doctoral Fund of Ministry of Education of China (20100203110002) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000901018, JY10000901021, JY10000901032 and JY10000901034).

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2014 Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg