N-person credibilistic strategic game

Abstract

This paper enlarges the scope of fuzzy-payoff game to n-person form from the previous two-person form. Based on credibility theory, three credibilistic approaches are introduced to model the behaviors of players in different decision situations. Accordingly, three new definitions of Nash equilibrium are proposed for n-person credibilistic strategic game. Moreover, existence theorems are proved for further research into credibilistic equilibrium strategies. Finally, two numerical examples are given to illustrate the significance of credibilistic equilibria in practical strategic games.

Keywords

fuzzy variable / credibility measure / strategic game / credibilistic equilibrium

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 70601034).

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2014 Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg