PDF
(600KB)
i
This article has been updated.
A Correction to this article was published on .
i
The Original Article was published on
i
The Original Article was published on
i
This article has been updated
i
This article was retracted on
i
This article has been updated
Abstract
This paper aims to measure insider trading probability and the corresponding regulation efficiency in China. Based on an identification of influencing factors of corporate governance, the author explores the relationship among insider trading, corporate governance, and corporate value. The author also uses, based on high-frequency financial data, the probability of insider trading to measure the degree of insider trading in China’s security market. Results reveal that China’s security market has failed to punish and prohibit illegal insider trading effectively. However, the security market does exert certain constraints on insider-trading-ridden listed companies. The conclusion of this article is that by improving corporate governance, we can enhance the efficiency of insider trading regulation. Practical implications are also discussed.
Keywords
14\02\90\4a\hcm0000126947.html
Cite this article
Download citation ▾
Weihua Zhu,.
Corporate Governance and Insider Trading Regulation
Efficiency.
Front. Bus. Res. China, 2010, 4 (2) : 306-324 DOI:10.1007/s11782-010-0014-2
CHANGE HISTORY
A Correction to this paper has been published:
https://doi.org
The Retraction Note was updated to reflect reception of statements of disagreement from all authors.
This article has been retracted.Please see the Retraction Notice for more detail:
https://doi.org