Potential Explosive Device on a Commuter Train: What Drives Train Drivers to Deviate from the Security Procedure?

Abstract

Explosives pose a major threat to urban metro rail systems. Train drivers are therefore expected to regularly perform security procedures in response to reports of suspicious items on the train. This study was conducted to develop a multi-factorial account of deviation from one such security procedure by train drivers. By analysing data from focus group interviews with 30 train drivers, observation in a rail simulator, actual cab rides, and training material four major themes emerged to explain why drivers may deliberately deviate from following normative procedures designed by their managers. This included perceived pressure from safety and service goals, stress and fatigue during peak hours of operation, and workload created by security tasks. The results are organised in a succinct model that draws a link between drivers’ perceived pressure from multiple goals, and the changing driving conditions in which they perform. The study proposes ways for managers of urban commuter rail networks to understand the pressures that their drivers face in performing security tasks that are not part of their conventional job profile. The findings can inform changes in training methods, encourage drivers to discuss their reasons for deliberate rule violation, and support the design of security procedures more likely to be implemented.

Keywords

Human error / Terrorism / Explosives / Security procedure / Task conflict / Goal pressure

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Funding

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (GB)(EP/G037264/1)