Self-truncated sampling produces more moderate covariation judgment and related decision than descriptive frequency information: The role of regressive frequency estimation

Abstract

Covariation judgment underlies a diversity of psychological theories and influences various everyday decisions. Information about covariation can be learned from either a summary description of frequencies (i.e., contingency tables) or trial-by-trial experience (i.e., sampling individual instances). Two studies were conducted to investigate the impact of information learning mode (i.e., description vs. self-truncated sampling) on covariation judgment and related decision. In each trial under the description condition, participants were presented with a contingency table with explicit cell frequencies, whereas in each trial under the self-truncated sampling condition, participants were allowed to determine when to stop sampling instances and thus the actual sample size. To eliminate sampling error, an other-yoked (i.e., between-subject) design was used in this research so that cell frequencies shown in a trial under the description condition were matched with those experienced in a trial under the self-truncated sampling condition. Experiment 1 showed that the self-truncated sampling condition led to more moderate covariation judgments than the description condition (i.e., a description–experience gap). Experiment 2 demonstrated further that the same gap extended to covariation-related decisions in terms of relative contingent preference (RCP). Regressive frequency estimation under self-truncated sampling appeared to underlie the consistent gaps found in the two studies, whereas the impact of regressive diagnosticity (i.e., the same sample of instances was viewed as less diagnostic under description than under self-truncated sampling) or simultaneous overestimation and underweighting of rare instances under experience was not supported by the observed data. Future research might examine alternative accounts of the observed gaps, such as the impacts of belief updating and stopping rule under self-truncated sampling.

Keywords

contingency table / covariation judgment / decision / regressive frequency estimation / self-truncated sampling

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