Research on Credit Regulation Mechanism of E-commerce Platform Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

In the growing e-commerce industry, the problem of malicious business operations has become increasingly prominent, exposing many problems such as weak supervision of e-commerce platforms and no way for consumers to complain. In order to solve the problems of counterfeit and shoddy products on e-commerce platforms and promote the sustainable development of the e-commerce industry in China, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of e-commerce platforms, merchants, and consumers, investigates the influence of each influencing factor on each party’s strategy choice, and provides targeted suggestions to e-commerce platforms based on relevant factors. Finally, the impact of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis. The results show that: 1) the smaller the cost difference between active and negative regulation, the more the e-commerce platform tends to active regulation strategy, but increasing fines for dishonest merchants and consumer complaints have little impact on the e-commerce platform; 2) increasing consumer compensation, creating an honest business environment, and reducing the cost of honest business all help companies tend to operate in good faith; 3) the only factor that affects the tendency of consumer complaint strategies is the cost of complaints. The loss suffered by silence and the compensation given to consumers have little effect on consumers’ tendency to complain strategy. The results can provide theoretical guidance for participants to make useful strategic decisions in the e-commerce market.

Keywords

Evolutionary game / e-commerce / data simulation

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