Drug Pricing Pattern in China: Dilemma and Countermeasure

Abstract

Maybe it is the most important medical reform for current China to adopt the bid-and-procurement scheme to correct the distortion of pharmaceutical resources allocation. Nevertheless, overpriced drugs often happen. This article aims to identify potential factors leading to the overpriced. Based on the mechanism rules of the scheme, it is found that unethical doctors are crucial to high price markup in the pricing pattern of drugs. Under China's actual conditions, asymmetric ownership is identified to be another cause of the overpriced by developing an asymmetric bidding model. How are the impacts of these two factors to be alleviated? Upon examination, several reform measures cannot effectively avoid the occurrence of the overpriced. Yet, the issue is very urgent for China because it is facing with the problem of population aging. Therefore, alternative options - a regulation-penalty tool and an investment subsidy policy - are proposed to improve China's health care.

Keywords

The bid-and-procurement scheme / overpriced drug / asymmetry / health-care reform

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