Robustness of equilibria in the graph model for conflict resolution

Abstract

A novel approach for assessing the robustness of an equilibrium in conflict resolution is presented. Roughly, an equilibrium is robust if it is resilient, or resistant to deviation. Robustness assessment is based on a new concept called Level of Freedom, which evaluates the relative freedom of a decision maker to escape an equilibrium. Resolutions of a conflict can be affected by changes in decision makers’ preferences, which may destabilize an equilibrium, causing the conflict to evolve. Hence, a conflict may become long-term and thereby continue to evolve, even after reaching an equilibrium. The new robustness measure is used to rank equilibria based on robustness, to facilitate distinguishing equilibria that are relatively sustainable. An absolutely robust equilibrium is a special case in which the level of freedom is at an absolute minimum for each individual stability definition.

Keywords

Robustness / equilibria / level of freedom / conflict evolution / graph model

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