RETRACTED ARTICLE: Exploring the value of installed base: Pricing information goods under value depreciation and consumer social learning

Abstract

While last decade has witnessed a rapid growth of digital economy, there is limited understanding in literature on whether the conventional wisdom on pricing strategy still holds for information goods. On one hand, information goods, similar to durable goods, are subject to value depreciation; on the other, they differ from traditional goods in negligible marginal cost and the sensitivity to social influences. This paper develops a two-period, game-theoretic model to investigate optimal pricing strategy of information goods. On one dimension, two different depreciation mechanisms (self- and time-depreciation) are considered; on the other, two prevalent pricing schemes (perpetual licensing and subscription-fee models) are studied. We obtain closed-form solutions in all scenarios. Our findings suggest that vendors of time-depreciation information goods should adopt subscription-fee model to attract early adopters and exploit social influences, while the vendors of self-depreciation information goods should strategically balance between depreciation and social influences. Interestingly, as social influences become strong enough, the difference between pricing schemes diminishes and the tradeoff between candidate strategies vanishes. We also extend the model to static pricing in which the vendor commits to future price. We discover that the superiority of subscription-fee model might be overturned under static pricing. Our results above also imply that building consumer feedback and interaction systems could be helpful for minimizing the potential loss of a suboptimal pricing scheme.

Keywords

Information goods / pricing strategies / product depreciation / consumer social learning

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