Pricing for corporate property rights transfer with stochastic markets

Abstract

This paper employs the real option theory to develop a pricing model for the transfer of property rights. We list the conditions for the good, intermediate and bad firms respectively, and work out the closed-form solution to the equilibrium transfer price, the optimal transfer timing. Using the comparative static analysis, we find that for good firms the transfer price of the target is increasing in its capital. The higher the capital of the target owns, the faster it will be transferred. For intermediate and bad firms, similar conclusions can be derived. The larger gap between the acquirer’s size and market power and those of the target, the lower the transfer triggered price. The transfer price goes up as the capital ratio of the acquirer over the target diminishes, while it is decreasing in the amount of the capital the target owns.

Keywords

Real option / asset pricing / optimal timing

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