Group-buying online auction and optimal inventory policy in uncertain market

Abstract

In this paper we consider a group-buying online auction (GBA) model for a monopolistic manufacturer selling novel products in the uncertain market. Firstly, we introduce the bidder’s dominant strategy, after which we optimize the GBA price curve and the production volume together. Finally, we compare the GBA with the traditional posted pricing mechanism and find that the GBA is highly probable to be advantageous over the posted pricing mechanism in some appropriate market environments.

Keywords

Group-buying auction / newsvendor model / demand uncertainty

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