Evolution trend analysis of urban residents’ low-carbon travel development based on multidimensional game theory

Abstract

In the travel process of urban residents, travelers will take a series of activities such as imitation and exclusion by observing other people’s travel modes, which affects their following trips. This process can be seen as a repeated game between members of the travelers. Based on the analysis of this game and its evolution trend, a multi-dimensional game model of low-carbon travel for residents is established. The two dimensional game strategies include whether to accept the low-carbon concept and whether to choose low-carbon travel. Combined with evolutionary game theory, the low-carbon travel choices of residents in different cities are simulated, and the evolutionary stability strategies are obtained. Finally, the influences of the main parameters of the model on the evolution process and stability strategies are discussed. The results show that travelers would develop towards two trends. Cities with more developed public traffic system have a higher proportion of receiving low-carbon concept and choosing low-carbon travel. Cities with underdeveloped public transport system could increase this proportion by some measures such as encouraging residents to choose slow transport and increasing the propaganda of low-carbon travel, but the positive effects of the measures like propaganda have a limited impact on the proportion.

Keywords

low-carbon travel / evolution trend / multidimensional game / travel modes

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