A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

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  • Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China

Published date: 05 Dec 2006

Abstract

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.

Cite this article

Cao Jianbo . A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2006 , 1(4) : 675 -687 . DOI: 10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6

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