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Complete Virtue and the Definition of Happiness in Aristotle
Published date: 15 Jun 2020
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In this paper, I challenge the standard reading of complete virtue (ἀρετή τελεία) in those disputed passages of Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. I argue that, for Aristotle, complete virtue is neither (i) wisdom nor (ii) a whole set of all virtues. Rather, it is a term used by Aristotle to denote any virtue that is in its complete or perfect form. In light of this reading, I offer a pluralist interpretation of Aristotelian happiness. I argue that for Aristotle, the life-long exercise of a predominant virtue—as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form—will suffice for human happiness. The so-called inclusivist and intellectualist notions of Aristotelian happiness, thus understood, are merely two forms (viz. the composite and the non-composite form) of the pluralist notion of Aristotelian happiness. And if I am right, my pluralist interpretation provides an alternative, if not better, solution to the long-standing problem of “dual happiness” in Aristotle.
Key words: Aristotle; complete virtue; happiness; inclusivism; intellectualism
HU Xinkai . Complete Virtue and the Definition of Happiness in Aristotle[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2020 , 15(2) : 293 -314 . DOI: 10.3868/s030-009-020-0016-9
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