Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?

XU Yingjin

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Front. Philos. China ›› 2016, Vol. 11 ›› Issue (1) : 3-20. DOI: 10.3868/s030-005-016-0002-1
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Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?

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Abstract

Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis, namely, that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which can achieve real intelligence. Stuart Shanker has provided the most systematic reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian argument against AI, building on Wittgenstein’s own statements, the “rule-following” feature of language-games, and the putative alliance between AI and psychologism. This article will attempt to refute this reconstruction and its constituent arguments, thereby paving the way for a new and amicable rather than agonistic conception of the Wittgensteinian position on AI.

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Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) / rule-following / psychologism / algorithm

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XU Yingjin. Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?. Front. Philos. China, 2016, 11(1): 3‒20 https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0002-1

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2014 Higher Education Press and Brill
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