Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?

Abstract

Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis, namely, that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which can achieve real intelligence. Stuart Shanker has provided the most systematic reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian argument against AI, building on Wittgenstein’s own statements, the “rule-following” feature of language-games, and the putative alliance between AI and psychologism. This article will attempt to refute this reconstruction and its constituent arguments, thereby paving the way for a new and amicable rather than agonistic conception of the Wittgensteinian position on AI.

Keywords

Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) / rule-following / psychologism / algorithm

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2014 Higher Education Press and Brill