The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings

ZHANG Wei

Front. Philos. China ›› 2009, Vol. 4 ›› Issue (1) : 130 -142.

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Front. Philos. China ›› 2009, Vol. 4 ›› Issue (1) : 130 -142. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-009-0008-3
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The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings

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Abstract

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.

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phenomenology / ethics / intentional feelings / value / Husserl / Scheler

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ZHANG Wei. The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings. Front. Philos. China, 2009, 4(1): 130-142 DOI:10.1007/s11466-009-0008-3

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