Frontiers of Mathematics in China >
Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics
Received date: 30 Jan 2015
Accepted date: 06 Mar 2015
Published date: 05 Jun 2015
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This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the unique long run equilibrium as the probability of players’ experimentation (or mutation) tends to zero in the best response dynamics. Here, it is shown that full-cooperation could emerge in the long run if one also cares for his neighbors in the bestresponse dynamics.
Yunshyong CHOW . Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics[J]. Frontiers of Mathematics in China, 2015 , 10(4) : 839 -856 . DOI: 10.1007/s11464-015-0478-7
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