The mode of deferential review on directors’ management decisions coincides with the requirements of adaptive efficiency, being conducive to encouraging directors’ tentative experiments. However, under the rule of business judgment, directors’ accountability requires for onerous burden of proof on the plaintiff, and the formal review of directors’ decisions and the uncertainty of the standard of care have rendered the duty of care almost an empty shell, and consequently the unfaithful conducts of directors between gross negligence and malice are always at large. The good faith path is not only a mechanism to fill the gap of accountability but an important mechanism to overcome the information asymmetry between shareholders and directors. The judicial practice of directors’ accountability in the 1990s produced a good faith path, and the good faith concept has been rejuvenated with creative changes, the standards of conducts become clear with the increasing operability of judicial reviews. In China, the standards on fiduciary conducts can be defined by the judicial interpretation of the Company Law, so as to incorporate such misconducts as intentionally causing the violation of law by company, failure to disclose candidly, abuse of power and gross disregard of responsibilities, hence inducing the good faith path to accountability.