A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences

Yao XIA , Zhiqiu HUANG

Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng ›› 2021, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (2) : 185 -201.

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Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng ›› 2021, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (2) : 185 -201. DOI: 10.1631/FITEE.1900726
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A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences

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Abstract

Service composition is an effective method of combining existing atomic services into a value-added service based on cost and quality of service (QoS). To meet the diverse needs of users and to offer pricing services based on QoS, we propose a service composition auction mechanism based on user preferences, which is strategy-proof and can be beneficial in selecting services based on user preferences and dynamically determining the price of services. We have proven that the proposed auction mechanism achieves desirable properties including truthfulness and individual rationality. Furthermore, we propose an auction algorithm to implement the auction mechanism, and carry out extensive experiments based on real data. The results verify that the proposed auction mechanism not only achieves desirable properties, but also helps users find a satisfactory service composition scheme.

Keywords

Combinatorial reverse auction / Service composition / User preference / Strategy-proof / Dynamic pricing

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Yao XIA, Zhiqiu HUANG. A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences. Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng, 2021, 22(2): 185-201 DOI:10.1631/FITEE.1900726

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