A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information

Wenzhang Zhang

doi:10.3868/s060-004-015-0020-8

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Front. Econ. China ›› 2015, Vol. 10 ›› Issue (3) : 467-482. DOI: 10.3868/s060-004-015-0020-8

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A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information

Wenzhang Zhang

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Abstract

In this paper I present a syntactic approach to modeling the interactive knowledge of rationality in finite games of perfect information. This approach allows for a more transparent interpretation. In particular, we have the intuitive picture of viewing knowledge as the input and decisions as the output of a player’s deliberation. This distinction is blurred in the semantic state-space approach.

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knowledge / rationality / backward induction / games of perfect information

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Wenzhang Zhang. A Syntactic Approach to Knowledge in Finite Games of Perfect Information. Front. Econ. China, 2015, 10(3): 467‒482 https://doi.org/10.3868/s060-004-015-0020-8