A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining

Yi Jin; Jianbo Zhang

doi:10.3868/s060-002-013-0014-1

Front. Econ. China ›› 2013, Vol. 8 ›› Issue (2) : 272 -287. DOI: 10.3868/s060-002-013-0014-1

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A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining

Yi Jin ¹
, Jianbo Zhang ²

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Abstract

In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.

Keywords

multilateral bargaining / heterogeneous discount factors / stationary SPE

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Yi Jin, Jianbo Zhang. A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining. Front. Econ. China, 2013, 8(2): 272-287 DOI:10.3868/s060-002-013-0014-1