A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation
Jesse A. Schwartz , Quan Wen
Front. Econ. China ›› 2013, Vol. 8 ›› Issue (1) : 1 -18.
A Characterization for Dominant Strategy Implementation
We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A perfect price discriminating mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any perfect price discriminating mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information.We establish a characterization for dominant strategy implementation: Any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a perfect price discriminating mechanism. We apply this characterization to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining.
perfect price discriminating (PPD) / dominant strategy implementation / Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms / public good provision / bilateral bargaining
Higher Education Press and Brill
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