Risk-aware user satisfaction maximization in vehicle-assisted multi-access edge computing offloading: a game-theoretic approach✩
Yu Dai , Jie Tian , Tiantian Li , Jing Wang , Chuanfen Feng
›› 2026, Vol. 12 ›› Issue (2) : 294 -305.
Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) enhances computational efficiency by enabling resource-constrained User Devices (UD) to offload tasks to edge servers. Compared to traditional edge servers fixed on the Small Cellular Base Stations (SBS), mobile vehicles with idle resources serve as mobile edge servers, which can reduce UD’s task latency due to closer proximity to the UD. However, due to the limited computation resources of vehicles and highly competitive among UD, the available computation resources provided by vehicles for UD are uncertain, which poses a challenge for UD in making task offloading decisions. In this paper, we establish a risk-aware task offloading framework in vehicle-assisted MEC networks with computation resource uncertainty, where UD make offloading decisions by considering their risk-aware behavior. We first characterize and model UD’s risk-aware behavior based on Prospect Theory (PT) and then formulate a user satisfaction maximization problem by optimizing the offloading strategy of UD. To solve it, we reformulate the above problem among multiple users as a non-cooperative game and prove the uniqueness of the Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). We also propose a low-complexity distributed iterative optimization algorithm to obtain the optimal offloading strategy. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme significantly enhances satisfaction utility of UD and reduces failure probability of vehicles compared to other benchmark methods.
Task offloading / Multi-access edge computing / Vehicle-assisted / Computation uncertainty / Prospect theory / Game theory
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