A blockchain-based privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant scheme (PPCR) for double auctions

Abstract

Electronic auctions (e-auctions) remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public. However, most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer, which is not always credible in practice. Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust, but they ignore the existence of collusion. In this paper, a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme (PPCR) for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology, which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy. A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance. A Dispute Resolution agreement (DR) is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct. In addition, a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol (CDR) is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small, significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution. Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.

Keywords

Privacy protection / Collusion resistance / Secure protocol / Blockchain-based double auction / Dispute resolution

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No. 2020YFB1005500), the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No. BK20202001), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. XJSJ23040), and the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No. 2021K596C).

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