Privacy-preserving gradient scheme for hot-rolled steel based on functional encryption
Yadong Wang , Nuerken Saireke , Jimin Wang
Electronic Research Archive ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (12) : 8896 -8916.
To address the vulnerability of output-layer gradient leakage during the distributed training of hot-rolled steel strip-crown prediction across multiple steel mills, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving split-layer federated learning scheme based on multi-client functional encryption. The proposed scheme keeps the input layer parameters at local clients, where they are updated using local data but are neither uploaded nor aggregated. Only the output layer gradients are encrypted and aggregated to update the shared output layer parameters. Leveraging the inner-product property of multiclient functional encryption alongside a capacity-aware, fixed client partitioning strategy, the secure aggregation of output layer gradients is achieved entirely within the ciphertext domain. Theoretical analysis derives a conditional stationarity bound for the shared output layer optimization phase under fixed local input layer parameters and quantization error. Furthermore, a reduction-based security analysis establishes single-round and multi-round ciphertext indistinguishability under the condition that all authorized fixed-subset outputs are identical between the compared inputs in every communication round. Under the honest-but-curious aggregation server and external eavesdropper threat models, this result provides confidentiality beyond the information revealed by these authorized outputs. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed secure aggregation framework based on multi-client functional encryption achieves a root mean square error of 3.6290 µm for strip-crown prediction. This result confirms the feasibility of applying privacy-preserving gradient aggregation to this industrial prediction task.
hot-rolled steel / functional encryption / privacy preservation / federated learning
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