A brief overview on secure control of networked systems

Abstract

This paper focuses on the issues of the security of networked control systems by summarizing recent progress in secure control of this research and application area. We mainly discuss existing results, especially in modeling issues, of three aspects: (1) attack mechanisms and their impacts on control systems, (2) the identification and design of attacks, and (3) secure estimation and control strategies. A conclusion is drawn at the end of this paper. In addition, several promising research tendencies of the development for secure control in networked control system are presented.

Keywords

Networked control system / Security / Attack / Estimation and control

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Funding

National Natural Science Foundation of China http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001809(61273114)

the National Natural Science Foundation of China http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001809(61263003)

International Corporation Project of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission(14510722500)

Program for Professor of Special Appointment (Eastern Scholar) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learning

Key Project of Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality(10JC1405000)