TWO MAIN APPROACHES OF INTERPRETING PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY

Svetlana M Bardina

Neurology Bulletin ›› 2016, Vol. XLVIII ›› Issue (4) : 92 -94.

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Neurology Bulletin ›› 2016, Vol. XLVIII ›› Issue (4) :92 -94. DOI: 10.17816/nb14081
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TWO MAIN APPROACHES OF INTERPRETING PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY

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Abstract

The article examines ways of interpreting psychiatric concepts in the philosophy of psychiatry. Two main approaches - a conceptual analysis and an interpretative model - are distinguished. The author compares these strategies and examines different ways of philosophical reflection on a psychiatric practice. Furthermore, the author highlights problematic aspects of both approaches. While a conceptual analysis deals rather with use of concepts, than with concepts themselves, an interpretative model could not provide a means of applying research findings.

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philosophy of psychiatry / conceptual analysis / interpretation

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Svetlana M Bardina. TWO MAIN APPROACHES OF INTERPRETING PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY. Neurology Bulletin, 2016, XLVIII(4): 92-94 DOI:10.17816/nb14081

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