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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2017, Vol. 12 Issue (3) : 450-465     DOI: 10.3868/s030-006-017-0032-6
Orginal Article |
Liangzhi and the Interpretative Obfuscation Regarding Knowledge
CHANG Tzu-li()
School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
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This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into “interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.” First, for Wang, what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge. Therefore, the focus of zhizhi 致 知 and gewu 格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either “the extension of knowledge” or “the investigation of things.” Apart from that, drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions: liangzhi as perfect knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement. By clarifying the above misinterpretations, the meaning and implication of liangzhi will, in turn, also become clearer.

Keywords liangzhi      zhizhi      gewu      tianli 天理      “interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge      ” moral agency     
Issue Date: 06 November 2017
 Cite this article:   
CHANG Tzu-li. Liangzhi and the Interpretative Obfuscation Regarding Knowledge[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2017, 12(3): 450-465.
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