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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2015, Vol. 10 Issue (3) : 430-443
research-article |
From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion
Michael Slote()
Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670, USA
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Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

Keywords altruism      egoism      emotion      expansion      freedom      human lives      neutral motives      spontaneity      virtue     
Issue Date: 28 October 2015
 Cite this article:   
Michael Slote. From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2015, 10(3): 430-443.
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