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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front Phil Chin    2011, Vol. 6 Issue (3) : 492-500
research-article |
Against Classical Dialetheism
WANG Wenfang()
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei 11221, Taiwan, China
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Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Classical dialetheism holds further the view that the law of excluded middle is indeed a logical law. Most famous dialetheists, such as G. Priest and J. Beall, are classical dialetheists; they take classical dialetheism to be the only plausible solution to the semantic paradoxes. The main contention of the paper is, however, that their views should be rejected. Based on inspecting Priest’s and Beall’s dialetheist theories from a special perspective, this paper contends that classical dialetheism has no natural and plausible way to assign truth values to various truth-ineliminable sentences, i.e., sentences whose truth-conditions essentially involve the property of being true. Several examples of such truth-ineliminable sentences are given in the paper, and two classical dialetheist strategies for assigning them truth values are inspected. This paper argues that none of these strategies is successful.

Keywords dialetheism      truth      truth-ineliminable sentences      semantic paradox     
Corresponding Authors: WANG Wenfang,   
Issue Date: 05 September 2011
 Cite this article:   
WANG Wenfang. Against Classical Dialetheism[J]. Front Phil Chin, 2011, 6(3): 492-500.
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