How to auction carbon emission allowances? A dynamic simulation analysis of spatiotemporal heterogeneity

Xianyu YU, Luxi XU, Dequn ZHOU, Qunwei WANG, Xiuzhi SANG, Xinhuan HUANG

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Front. Eng ›› 2024, Vol. 11 ›› Issue (3) : 430-454. DOI: 10.1007/s42524-023-0295-8
Energy and Environmental Systems
RESEARCH ARTICLE

How to auction carbon emission allowances? A dynamic simulation analysis of spatiotemporal heterogeneity

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Abstract

There is notable variability in carbon emission reduction efforts across different provinces in China, underscoring the need for effective strategies to implement carbon emission allowance auctions. These auctions, as opposed to free allocations, could be more aligned with the principle of “polluter pays.” Focusing on three diverse regions — Ningxia, Beijing, and Zhejiang — this study employs a system dynamics simulation model to explore markets for carbon emissions and green certificates trading. The aim is to determine the optimal timing and appropriate policy intensities for auction introduction. Key findings include: (1) Optimal auction strategies differ among the provinces, recommending immediate implementation in Beijing, followed by Ningxia and Zhejiang. (2) In Ningxia, there’s a potential for a 6.20% increase in GDP alongside a 21.59% reduction in carbon emissions, suggesting a feasible harmony between environmental and economic objectives. (3) Market-related policy variables, such as total carbon allowances and Renewable Portfolio Standards, significantly influence the optimal auction strategies but have minimal effect on carbon auction prices.

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Keywords

carbon allowances / carbon allowance auctions / carbon emissions trading / Renewable Portfolio Standard / system dynamics

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Xianyu YU, Luxi XU, Dequn ZHOU, Qunwei WANG, Xiuzhi SANG, Xinhuan HUANG. How to auction carbon emission allowances? A dynamic simulation analysis of spatiotemporal heterogeneity. Front. Eng, 2024, 11(3): 430‒454 https://doi.org/10.1007/s42524-023-0295-8

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Competing Interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Nomenclature
Abbreviations Variables
CET Carbon Emissions Trading
TGC Tradable Green Certificate
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standard
EU European Union
ETS Emissions Trading System
MAC Marginal abatement cost
CEA Carbon Emission Allowance
MEE Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NBS National Bureau of Statistics
TCE Tons of coal equivalent
10K-ton Ten thousand tons
NCETN National Carbon Emission Trading Network
GWh Gigawatt hour
B Billion
Parameters
CECoef CO2 emission coefficient
CorrCoef Correction coefficient
Variables
CE CO2 emissions
CVol Carbon trading volume
PSREF Power supply reference value
REAbs Renewable energy to be absorbed
RECsm Renewable energy consumption
TECsm Traditional energy consumption
TCsm Total electricity consumption
EnvCost Environmental cost
AbsCost Absorption cost
CECost Carbon emission cost
EE Energy efficiency
CPEN Carbon penalty
CPEN price Carbon penalty price
TPEN price TGC penalty price
UnQty Unabsorbed quantity
Tvol TGC volume

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