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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Front. Philos. China    2009, Vol. 4 Issue (4) : 563-575
Research articles |
Truth, correspondence and deflationism
James O. YOUNG,
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, Victoria BC V8W 3P4, Canada;
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Abstract The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.
Keywords truth      truthmakers      deflationary theory of truth      correspondence theory of truth      T-sentences      
Issue Date: 05 December 2009
 Cite this article:   
James O. YOUNG. Truth, correspondence and deflationism[J]. Front. Philos. China, 2009, 4(4): 563-575.
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